Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

Name: Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
Author: Antonin Scalia, Bryan A. Garner

by Antonin Scalia, Bryan A. Garner

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“A definitive guide to textualism, providing the principled techniques for deriving objective meaning from statutes and constitutions.”

Key Takeaways

1Adhere to the ordinary meaning of words at the time of enactment. Legal interpretation must prioritize the original public meaning of the text, as understood by a reasonable reader when the law was written, to ensure democratic stability.
2Employ established canons of construction as neutral analytical tools. The semantic, syntactic, and contextual canons provide a disciplined framework for resolving ambiguities without resorting to judicial policy preferences.
3Reject the misuse of legislative history to divine intent. Statutory meaning resides in the enacted text alone; relying on committee reports or floor speeches invites subjectivity and undermines legislative accountability.
4Distinguish textualism from destructive strict construction. Textualism seeks the fair, reasonable reading of a text in full context, avoiding the artificially narrow readings that characterize flawed strict constructionism.
5Apply interpretive principles consistently across all legal texts. The same fundamental canons govern the interpretation of constitutions, statutes, and contracts, creating a unified and predictable jurisprudence.
6Recognize precedent's role while anchoring it in textual fidelity. While respect for stare decisis is necessary for stability, it cannot permanently legitimize interpretations that clearly contradict the original textual meaning.

Description

Reading Law presents a comprehensive and systematic defense of textualism, the judicial philosophy that insists a legal text’s objective meaning—understood as its original public meaning—must govern its application. Scalia and Garner argue that this approach is the only one consistent with democratic principles, as it constrains judges from imposing their own policy preferences and respects the legislature’s lawmaking role. The method requires examining language through the lens of a reasonable person at the time of the text’s adoption, using grammar, syntax, and established linguistic conventions. The book’s core is a detailed taxonomy of fifty-seven canons of construction, divided into fundamental, semantic, syntactic, and contextual principles. These are not mere stylistic suggestions but essential tools for resolving ambiguity. The authors illustrate each canon with vivid, often quirky cases—debating whether a burrito qualifies as a sandwich or if a silent movie constitutes a “talkie”—to demonstrate how these principles operate in real litigation. This section functions as both a persuasive argument for textualist methodology and an indispensable reference work for legal drafters and interpreters. A significant portion of the work is devoted to dismantling rival interpretive theories, particularly those that rely on legislative intent or a perceived “spirit of the law.” The authors contend such approaches are inherently subjective and destabilizing. They also identify and critique thirteen fallacies that commonly corrupt legal reasoning, such as the false notion that words should be interpreted to avoid absurd results when the plain language dictates otherwise. Ultimately, the treatise is a masterclass in legal reasoning aimed at judges, lawyers, legislators, and serious students of law. It seeks to restore a measure of predictability and intellectual discipline to judicial interpretation, framing textualism not as a conservative project but as a necessary bulwark for the rule of law itself.

Community Verdict

The legal community hails this work as an indispensable, even revolutionary, reference. Practitioners and students praise its unparalleled utility in both interpreting statutes and drafting airtight legal documents, with many describing it as a constant desktop companion. The synthesis of canons, illuminated by engaging and often humorous case examples, is universally celebrated for its clarity and practical genius. Criticism is primarily philosophical, focusing on the book’s dogmatic defense of textualism. Some readers find the introductory polemic overly rigid and dismissive of competing judicial philosophies, arguing it presents a formalistic approach that can lead to perverse results. A minority of reviewers, while acknowledging the work’s value as a resource, suggest its advocacy portions are more effective as a primer for the already converted than as a rigorous engagement with scholarly critics.

Hot Topics

1The practical value of the canons of construction for legal drafting and statutory interpretation, cited as a transformative professional tool.
2The philosophical debate between textualism/originalism and living constitutionalism, framing it as a conflict over judicial restraint versus activism.
3The book's effectiveness as a definitive resource and reference manual versus a cover-to-cover scholarly treatise.
4The accessibility and engaging, often humorous writing style that makes a dense subject approachable.
5Justice Scalia's polemical tone in the introduction, perceived by some as dogmatic and overly defensive of his judicial philosophy.
6The applicability of the text's principles beyond American law, noted as universal rules of interpretation for any legal system.